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Abstract—Cyber physical security research for smart grid is
currently one of the nation’s top R&D priorities. The existing
vulnerabilities in the legacy grid infrastructure make it particu-
larly susceptible to countless cyber-attacks. There is a growing
emphasis towards building interconnected, sophisticated feder-
ated testbeds to perform realistic experiments by allowing the
integration of geographically-dispersed resources in the dynamic
cyber-physical environment. In this paper, we present a cyber
(network) based federation testbed to validate the performance of
an anomaly detector in context of a Wide Area Protection (WAP)
security. Specifically, we have utilized the resources available at
the Iowa State University Power Cyber (ISU PCL) Laboratory
to emulate the substation and local center networks; and the
US Army Research Laboratory (ARL); to emulate the regional
control center network. Initially, we describe a hardware-in-the
loop based experimental setup for implementing data integrity
attacks on an IEEE 39 bus system. We then perform network
packet analysis focusing on latency and bandwidth as well as
evaluate the performance of a decision tree based anomaly
detector in measuring its ability to identify different attacks.
Our experimental results reveal the computed wide area network
latency; bandwidth requirement for minimum packet loss; and
successful performance of the anomaly detector. Our studies also
highlight the conceptual architecture necessary for developing
the federated testbed, inspired by the NASPI network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today’s power grid is evolving into a highly complex,
interconnected, cyber-physical system to meet the real-time
demand response where numerous controllers are performing
different operations to maintain the stability and reliability of
the power system. In earlier days, the traditional power system
relied on SCADA communications for system protection and
control, which provided limited capability in capturing a
comprehensive dynamic view as well as providing appropri-
ate control actions to mitigate power quality disturbances.
However, with significant advancements in the application of
synchrophasor technology, and communication infrastructure,
wide-area measurements based protection scheme, also known
as Remedial Action Scheme (RAS), can be implemented
with the objectives of detecting disturbances, and providing
automated, intelligent control actions to enhance the system
stability and reliability with system wide information [1].
Based on the NERC document, the Synchrophasor based RAS
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(SP RAS) is also considered a “do no harm” scheme as it
does not take corrective action that can have a negative impact
on the system stability [2]. As wide-area protection schemes
evolve, serious challenges exist to ensure a robust security
profile. The published literature, government documents, and
surveys have reported numerous malicious incidents targeting
industrial control systems (ICSs) including Stuxnet and the
Ukraine grid hack [3]. The papers in [4], [5] discuss the vul-
nerability assessment on SCADA communications and shows
how a coordinated cyber-attack can affect the normal opera-
tion of the RAS. Given the amount of conventional security
measures deployed, coupled with legacy infrastructure, it is
not the matter of “if” but a matter of “when” in regards
to these existing applications becoming exploited by cyber
attacks. Thus, there is a compelling urge to develop attack-
resilient RAS schemes. Existing state-of-the-art research is
often constrained by its real-world practical application as
the current operational systems cannot be used to perform
cyber physical security related experiments. The Cyber Phys-
ical System (CPS) security testbed plays a vital role in the
development, evaluation, and validation of novel technologies
and tools. Most of the published work in the past are based on
the traditionally isolated CPS testbed which does not provide
a realistic platform to emulate the real power grid. Since the
power system substations are geographically dispersed; and are
controlled and monitored through high-speed communications,
the resources available at geographically dispersed multiple
testbeds can be shared through the common network like
internet or intranet to develop an interconnected testbed, also
known as the federated testbed. It can provide a high fidelity
representation of the real-world grid architecture.
In an earlier effort, we have presented the notion of decision
tree based anomaly detection using differential PMU features
for detecting a data integrity attack (malicious tripping) in
the context of WAP security [6]. In this work, we have pro-
posed the cyber(network) based federated testbed architecture,
inspired by the NASPInet architecture, to analyze the wide-
area network traffic, and to evaluate the performance of the
anomaly detector using a realistic platform for detecting cyber-
attacks. For developing the federated testbed, we have lever-
aged the resources available at Iowa State University’s Power
Cyber Laboratory (ISU PCL) and the US Army Research
Laboratory (ARL) testbeds, where the regional control center
is operating at the ARL testbed, and the substation and local
center networks are operating at the ISU PC testbed. ARL’s
control center receives the PMU data measurements which are
further processed by the anomaly detector to identify possible
anomalies in real-time. Apart from the malicious tripping
attack, we have also considered other data integrity attacks
including ramp and pulse attacks, which are implemented in
the hardware-in-the-loop based cyber-physical environment at
the ISU PCL testbed.
II. OVERVIEW AND RELATED WORKS
A. Attack Surface on RAS
1) Background on RAS : In this work, we have considered
the response based generation rejection scheme, where, the
centralized, control center based controller, (RAS controller),
checks the maximum operation transfer capability (OTCmax)
of the transmission lines during single line contingency. It
then determines how much generation has to be reduced to
prevent thermal overloading on the remaining connected lines.
Specifically, we have focused on the SCADA-Synchrophasor
integrated, control center based remedial action scheme, which
receives PMU measurements including line flows, relay status
and generator output to detect disturbances, and SCADA
based, closed loop control signals are employed to reduce the
generation, if necessary, to prevent the thermal overloading.
More details are provided in [6].
2) Attack Vectors on WAP: Previous research efforts have
shown how the attacker can strategically modify the sensor
measurements and control signals to inject disturbances in
the generation rejection based RAS scheme. In our previous
works, we have shown how stealthy cyber-attacks, which
includes malicious tripping followed by pulse or ramp attack
on the generator can affect the system and generator stability
[5], [12]. Specifically, as a part of the attack experiment,
we have considered three different attack vectors, which are
defined as:
1) Malicious tripping attack: It involves tripping the physi-
cal relay maliciously. We have performed this attack by
replaying the tripping packets through the Man-in-the
Middle (MITM) over wide-area network.
2) Pulse attack:This attack vector involves periodically
changing the input control signal by adding the pulse
attack parameter, λpulse, for a small interval (t1) and
retaining back the original input for the remaining
interval (T- t1) for the given time period, (T), as shown
in equation 1.
3) Ramp attack: This attack vector involves adding a time
varying ramp signal to the input control signal based on




Pi(1 + λpulse)(t = t1)
Pi(t = T − t1)
(1)
Pramp = Pi + λramp ∗ t (2)
B. Why Federation CPS based Testbed?
The concept of a federation can be defined as the integra-
tion of multi-domain specific testbeds to leverage individual
resources to achieve synergy among geographically dispersed
components without exposing their individual properties. It
can be used for different applications such as solving research-
oriented problems, developing novel CPS security tools, pro-
viding scaling capability to simulate the large-scale system,
and capturing real-time communication networks to emulate
the real-grid network. There exist few works, which capture
the flavor of a federation in some specific applications. Previ-
ously, the ISU PowerCyber testbed successfully federated with
the DETER testbed at the University of Southern California’s
Information Science Institute to demonstrate different cyber-
attack experiments on wide area controllers [7]. The paper in
[8] shows how the two real-time digital simulators (RTDS) can
be connected to perform distributed simulations. The project
report in [9] addresses the NIST’s effort in developing a
cross-sector CPS testbed to enhance the interoperability among
multiple testbeds. Bryan et al. shows the power hardware-
in-the-loop (PHIL) based closed loop co-simulation for the
distributed system by using resources available at PNNL and
NREL [10]. In a similar work, the press article in [11]
mentions the real-time connection between multiple real-time
simulators, available at a distance in NREL and INL, with
an average delay of 28 milliseconds. Although good works,
there is a strong need to develop a robust platform for exper-
imental testing and validation at the federation level for cyber
physical security. This paper shows our research-in-progress
work towards developing the sophisticated, federated testbed.
We do not explicitly solve the issues related to the federation
including packet loss or communication latency. However, we
have utilized this platform for the network analysis, testing
and validating the applied anomaly detection in the context of
WAP security.
III. FEDERATION ARCHITECTURE & DETECTION
METHODOLOGY
A. Proposed Federation Architecture
Figure 1 depicts the proposed high-level view of federation
architecture using multiple testbeds for the CPS security. We
have followed the NASPI network (NASPInet) conceptual
architecture’s guideline to develop the industry-grade CPS fed-
erated testbed infrastructure. Generally, the NASPInet consists
of phasor gateways (PGs) and a data bus (DB), where PMU
data is shared among multiple utilities/centers in the standard,
and decentralized fashion. In this architecture, two testbeds are
connected through the common data bus and user end gate-
ways to facilitate the bi-directional streaming of real-time data
including the SCADA and PMU measurements in a realistic
way. Specifically, we are proposing a network-based federated
architecture between two testbeds, where the substation and
local control center networks operate in testbed 1; and the
regional control center network is located in testbed 2. For
developing the common data bus between two phasor/SCADA
gateways for testbed1 and testbed 2, the IPSec virtual private
network (VPN) tunnel is configured using the UDP protocol
by exchanging internal and end points certificates, to allow the
secure, real-time communication between the two networks.
Since PMU based applications have a timing constraint as
the latency is an important factor, UDP is preferred at the
transport layer over the TCP. The pfSense software can be used
as the phasor-SCADA gateway to provide the access point to
the PMU and SCADA data. It can also work as a firewall
and router to whitelist the configured devices, monitor the
network packets, and provide Quality of services (QoSs). It is
important to note that, based on the possible attack surfaces (as
shown with a red arrow in figure 1), testbed 1 can work as the
cyber security experimental station, where, different types of
attacks can be implemented on the SCADA and synchrophasor
network. In this work, we assume that the attacker has access
to the substation and local control network in the testbed
1, and the regional control center is operating in the secure
environment in testbed 2. The anomaly detector operates at
the regional control center to detect anomalies based on the
applied detection methodology
Fig. 1: High-level network-based Federated architecture for
attack-detection experiment.
B. Anomaly Detection Methodology
Figure 2 shows the anomaly detection methodology for
detecting different classes of data integrity attacks. We have
extended the previous methodology by also addressing gen-
eration altering attacks through the ramp and pulse attacks;
to target the generator, which is controlled by a protection
controller. We have applied the decision tree (J45) based
data mining technique to build the classification model. For
building the classification model, the PMU measurements in-
cluding generator bus voltages (Vg), line bus voltages (Vi, Vj),
where subscripts i and j represent the sending and receiving
end of the transmission lines, and the generator frequency
(F), are collected from deployed PMUs for computing the
derived features, where, ∆X includes difference in sending and
receiving ends line voltage (∆Vij), change in generator bus
voltages (∆Vg) and change in generator frequency (∆F).
dX
dt







), and generator frequency (
dF
dt
). As part of
the supervised learning, we have generated a dataset library
of various events, including cyber-attacks and line faults, and
labelled them in the integer format. The generated dataset
library is used for training the model. Finally, the trained
model is deployed for testing multi-events classification, and
later for sending the alert messages and possible corrective
actions.
Fig. 2: Anomaly detection methodology for WAP.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND CASE STUDY
Figure 3 shows the hardware in the loop (HIL) based
federated testbed for attack-detection experiments. We have
modeled the IEEE 39 bus system in ARTEMiS/SSN
(eMEGASIM), and simulated it in real-time using real time
digital simulator (OPAL-RT). We have deployed virtual PMU
models to generate synthetic phasors, and later to compute the
derived features inside the simulator. The computed features
are sent to the hardware PDC; at the ISU PC network, which
forwards the data to software super PDC (Open PDC) at the
ARL control center over the VPN network. The super PDC
saves the data in a local csv historian and a MySQL database.
The stored data is used for generating the labeled database,
and further training and testing of the decision tree based
algorithm. The WAP controller is running in a python script
which is communicating with the substation RTU; in the ISU
PC testbed, through Kepserver’s OPC Unified Architecture
(UA) client-server tunneling. The substation RTU, as shown
with pink box, is communicating with the simulator using
the DNP3 (OPC server) protocol for SCADA communication.
The software PDC at ARL collects the measurements and
forwards them to the anomaly detector and RAS (WAPS)
controller. The protection controller receives the measurements
from MySQL in real-time, and sends the control signal back
to the ISU substation through the OPC UA client-server
SCADA communication to provide the appropriate response,
if necessary, to close the loop.
Figure 3 also shows the IEEE 39 bus system, which is
divided into two major areas, where area 2, operating as a
generation area, is supplying power to the area 1 through tie-
lines L15-16 and L16-17. If the breaker for line L16-17 is
tripped then line L15-16 will present an overloaded condition.
Accordingly, the WAP controller will shed the generation (Gen
6) at bus 35, as shown in colored circle, and equal amount of
load is shed at bus 18 to maintain the system stability. To
simulate the HIL experiment, relays 1 and 2 are mapped to
lines L15-16, and L16-17 respectively. For the attack imple-
mentation, we have performed a malicious tripping attack on
the relay 2 to trip the line L16-17, by replaying the tripping
packet using a python script with Man-in-the-Middle (MITM)
technique between the substation and local control center. For
executing ramp and pulse attacks on generator (Gen 6) at bus
35, a Trojan horse malware is installed in the OPC server based
substation RTU, providing backdoor access to the attacker.
The attacker closes the legitimate RTU program and initiates
a python scripted malicious logic routine which periodically
sends control signals to the simulator targeting the generator
(Gen 6) to initiate ramp and pulse attacks. We have also
simulated three phase to ground faults followed by the normal
tripping of the line L16-17 to simulate physical disturbances;
and multiple simulations are performed for different cases as
discussed in [6]. It is appropriate to note that the due to the
space limitation, we are not discussing the details of different
scenarios required for generating the labeled datasets. Overall,
we have generated datasets for the four events: 3 phase to
ground fault (0), malicious tripping (1), ramp attack (2) and;
pulse attack (3), with the detection results provided in the next
section.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In order to address the challenges of Quality of Service
(QoS), we have analyzed the PMU packets in terms of network
latency, communication bandwidth; and detection rate. Based
on the network analysis using Wireshark, we have computed
the average value of the computed bandwidth to be around
15,250 bytes/sec, with a minimum value of 15,000 bytes/sec,
and a maximum value of 15300 bytes/sec for 17 phasors with
sampling rate of 60 samples per second. We did not observe
any dropped packets during the real-data streaming, which
shows that the given bandwidth is adequate to ensure that the
PMU data is transferred over the VPN network.
Fig. 3: Federated Testbed based Experimental Setup for attack-
detection experiment
1) Network Packet Analysis : The total time for receiving
the network packets depends on various factors such as sam-
pling rate, communication latency, additional communication
system delays, processing and computation times. In this
experiment, we have computed the round trip time (RTT)
during ping scanning, which is the length of time between the
transfer of TCP/IP network packets to reach to its destination,
and the arrival of an acknowledgement before sending the new
packet. Figure 4(a) shows the ping latency distribution, where
the regional control center is pinged every 0.5 seconds. It can
be observed that the maximum latency is computed around 87
milli-seconds, while the minimum is approximately 35 milli-
seconds. As a major latency factor, we have computed the data
delay, which is the time delay from when measurements leave
the substation PDC and reaches to the regional control center
PDC. We have observed that the average value of computed
delay is 16.6 milli-seconds, with a minimum of 1.9 milli-
seconds and maximum of 26.7 milli-seconds.
2) Detection Rate Analysis : Based on the generated
datasets at the regional control center, we have evaluated the
performance of the anomaly detector in terms of accuracy,
sensitivity, specificity, and precision to provide a comprehen-
sive picture of how the classifiers are classifying the four
(a) Round Trip Time (RTT) delay
(b) PMU packets delay
Fig. 4: Latency for Round Trip Time (RTT) and PMU packets
delay during live-streaming
events {0,1,2,3}. Sensitivity, also known as recall, defines the
true positive rate (TPR), specificity defines the true negative
rates (TNR), and the precision measures the positive predictive
value. It can be observed that J48 decision tree (J48 DT)
consistently performs better than the other classifiers including
support vector machine (SVM), K-nearest neighbors (KNN),
and Bayesian networks (Bayes Net). J48 DT exhibits an
accuracy rate of 99.6%, precision rate of 98.38%, specificity
of 99.89% and a sensitivity of 99.03%.
VI. CONCLUSION
The cyber physical system (CPS) federated testbed works
as a driving force to enable the pipeline from state-of-
the art research work through the transition to industry by
experimental testing and validation. In this work, we have
presented a cyber (network) based federated testbed; inspired
by the NASPINet architecture, to evaluate the applied anomaly
detector, as proposed in [6], in terms of network latency,
communication bandwidth, and accuracy rate. We have im-
plemented the realistic data integrity attacks targeting physical
Fig. 5: Accuracy rate for different classifiers.
relays and substation RTUs, located at the ISU Power Cyber
lab. We then validated the performance of a decision tree (J48)
based anomaly detector, located at the ARL regional control
center; for detecting tripping attacks, ramp and pulse attacks.
Our experimental results showed that the computed maximum
latency for incoming synchrophasor data packets is around
26.7 milli-seconds, with a round trip time of (RTT) 87 milli-
seconds. This is well within the requirement of overloading
based WAP scheme that has timing constraints in the order of
seconds (1-100 seconds), however, it may affect the detection
time for the applied anomaly detector. The decision tree
based anomaly detection algorithm is shown to be consistently
outperform the other machine learning classifiers. Future work
will extend the cyber federation to a cyber-physical federation
thus allowing distributed level system interaction and cyber
security realted experiments on multiple testbeds.
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